This paper uses data from Taiwan's banking sector to investigate if state-owned banks can serve as an internal regulation mechanism to sustain market competition. In contrast to the traditional second-best literature, the evidence shows that a certain degree of market coordination exists in the industry, even if the government owns most of the dominant banks in Taiwan.
Introduction
Many studies focusing on the issue of banking market competition in the empirical literature are based on data from the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada. As opposed to the Anglo-Saxon financial system founded on private ownership of banks, in most developing countries, the state owns the majority of the banks and controls a significant portion of the financial system's assets. 1 However, not too much attention has been given to the effect of such ownership settings on market competition in both the public economics and industrial organization literature. This article aims to provide an empirical study to detect the differences in competitive behaviors between state-owned banks and private banks.
Aspects of the second-best literature 2 propose that state-owned banks could be instructed to maximize social welfare and could serve as a policy instrument for the government to regulate an imperfect competitive market.
Thus, state-owned banks tend to provide loans at lower interest rates.
However, a criticism often made of public ownership is that the monitoring system is too poor, leaving managers with considerable discretion to pursue their personal agendas. The personal agenda could consist of a variety of elements. One of them is to avoid the stiff competition 1 According to Beck et al. (1999) products tend to be homogeneous within the network of each bank. These banks can thus be considered to be operating in the same deposit and loan market.
As to the market structure, Taiwan 
The Model
The empirical study is conducted under the structure of Spiller and Favaro (1984) , and assumes that banks compete in market share by changing the quantity of loans supplied and deposits solicited. Consider a banking sector with n banks producing a homogeneous output and facing a demand function given by
where t P is the price, t Q is the total quantity, and it q is the ith bank's output at time t. Each bank attempts to maximize profits
, where 
where subscripts s (state-owned) and p (private) represent the group to which the bank belongs. 
, and
is demand elasticity. In the similar way, one can get the supply relation for the group of private banks:
Bes ides, the following demand relationship is estimated using time series data for the same period:
where GNP is gross national product in fixed prices, ! is the constant term, and ! is the income elasticity of demand. The model includes two supply equations ((2) and (3)) and one demand equation (4) The second-best literature worries that private firms might behave non-competitively, leading to a market failure.
These studies suggest that the first best allocation can be achieved if public firms can compute the competitive price in the industry and make up any difference between the corresponding output and private firms' output. Hence, state-owned banks should not behave less aggressively i.e. a smaller output and higher price, for the sake of expected retaliation from their rivals.
If our empirical evidence shows that state-owned banks behave less aggressively and choose a smaller output as well as higher price, then one can claim that the second-best solution is not acceptable in Taiwan's banking sector.
Empirical Results
Cournot Conjectures. Table 1 
, is performed using the likelihood ratio test, and the null hypothesis is rejected at the 99% level. Thus, one can conclude that, at least, some banks do incorporate into their decision process their rivals' expected reactions. Notes: The figures in brackets are asymptotic standard errors, which are estimated by the delta method. * denotes that the estimates are significant at the 1% level.
Among the private banks, most of them are small with respect to market share and would not expect reactions 3 The state-owned bank conjecture of small private banks is negative, provided that the bank has a market share higher than 2.3%. from state-owned banks, except that some large private banks might hold the consensus to coordinate the market behaviors and indeed be concerned about the reactions of state-owned banks. This makes up a typical incomplete cartel, in which large firms cooperate, while the small fringe firms are ignored by dominant firms.
Conclusion
The empirical evidence reveals that a certain degree of market coordination exists in Taiwan's banking industry and rejects the hypotheses of the second-best literature, even if some banks are owned by the government. The significantly positive conjecture illustrates a state-owned bank's belief that other state-owned banks will respond aggressively to any attempt by it to increase its output.
Such a belief leads state-owned banks to less aggressive behaviors, i.e. a smaller output and a higher price. The expectation of an aggressive rival response actually leads to more collusive equilibrium behavior.
